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Abstract 
“Congestion costs” occur in the electricity market when the power flows, equivalent to a projection mapping of 
energy injection and withdrawal, established by the “electricity stock exchange” and by “bi-lateral contracts”, are 
incompatible with the transfer capacity guaranteed by the power grid, in required security conditions. Transfer 
restrictions in the national and transboundary transmission grid can potentially determine the market segmentation in 
different geographical areas, preventing the producers to compete freely to satisfy the overall demand in those areas. 
As a result of power congestions, those producers that have reduced limitations in the power transfer are obviously 
favored, also if in the presence of high marginal production costs and prices, leading to the constitution of pools of 
producers that de facto control the local market. In particular this paper aims at describing and discussing the 
problem of power congestions, electricity price formation and congestion risk management. 
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1. Power congestions, electricity price formation and congestion risk 
The congestions of the power grid transportation system present structural and managing problems when the 
transmission capacity of an asset obtain an economic value1,2,3 (Fig.1). 
The examples offered by the literature on congestive strategic behavior of the operators especially those who can 
count on a higher amount of electricity across the national territory4,5,6. The main principle of such a strategy resides 
in the ability to take advantage of the criticalities of power transmission or use hybrid solutions (such as combination 
of more technologies7,8. The impossibility of transferring power in some segments of the power transmission line, 
the voltage required, leads in fact, to the use of more expensive power units in the downstream under network. 
Congestions are ascribable to several interconnected factors, such as the variability in electricity demand in relation 
with the lack of transmission plants, or the derivation from the deregulated electricity markets system that influences 
power supplies according to the different distribution of power flows. For this reason in Italy the Integrated 
Electricity Market Rules issued by Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME) considers, both for the Daily Electricity 
Market and the Arrangement Market, the actuation of a “zonal” strategy to solve zonal congestions characterized by 
the possible formation of market areas with different power selling price9,10,11: the market splitting at a national 
level, and the market coupling with neighboring countries. This type of intervention implies a zonal partition into 
geographical areas divided according to portions of the power grid that follow practical limitations in power 
exchange with the neighboring areas, and that guarantee, at the same time, the security of the electricity power grid. 
The segmentation of the market zones is necessary every time the established limits are exceeded, with the 
subsequent formation of different prices in each. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example of the impact of hourly congestions in the power grid. (Source: Terna Strategic plan 2013-2015). 
In this case, regardless of the algorithm used to calculate electricity price, we would normally have a higher price 
in those zones importing electricity9. 
Anyway, the algorithms used to establish which units should produce electricity is based on the maximizing of a 
function of social welfare of the system12,13,6, limited though by the maximum admissible flows between the zones 
where the zonal price is determined by the equilibrium between zonal demand and offer bids. Whereas producers are 
paid at a zonal price, consumers will only pay the Single National Price (PUN). 
The structure of electricity markets expose operators to two types of electricity price risk exposure:  
- price volatility risk (exposure) in a period of time, that influences the purchase and sell in power markets 
or in the over the counter (OTC) market in bilateral contracts14,15,16; 
- volatility of payment risk for the transfer capacity right of use, related to the volatility of the electricity 
price in space, derived from grid congestions and, to the formation of different zonal prices according to 
the location of power plants over the counter (OTC) market in bilateral contracts14. 
2. Methodology 
The paper adopts a qualitative research methodological approach based on the descriptive case study protocol 
defined by Yin RK17. The aim of this paper is at describing and discussing the problem of power congestions, 
electricity price formation and congestion risk management. The sources of information cushion adopted for this 
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case study are mainly formed by policies and official documents released by the Italian central government. Previous 
studies18,19,20,21,22 and personal experiences complete our survey. 
3. Trend in the Italian macro areas 
In the presence of power congestions and of a zonal splitting (market splitting), the difference between electricity 
price transferred within the same zones of buyers and sellers is measured by the differential of the value between 
two zonal markets, that is, the differential of power withdrawal price (paid by the demand) and the injection price 
(received by the offer). A solution to across borders power congestions at a European level can be represented by the 
market coupling23,24,25, an implicit auction mechanism that cancel the inefficiencies in power exchanges, where the 
transfer capacity is allocated and valued according to the level of prices determined in national auction bids.  
Physical constraints in the power transmission can put the execution of electricity buying and selling agreements 
in conflict with the security guarantee of the system. It is therefore necessary to manage with the maximum 
efficiency the programmed power injections and withdrawals, that is to operate through a central system, in order to 
execute the buying and selling agreements and organize the structural constraints of power transmission. 
At a national level 40% of electrical overloads are located in the South, where the most critical zones are 
represented by the intersection areas between Puglia and Campania. In those areas, in fact, the incidence of risk of 
power congestion is very high, in particular in the primary power reserve of Campania3. The areas presenting a 
higher risk are those where the density of population and electricity consumption is greater. In particular for 
Florence, Rome, Milan and Naples the occurrence is ascribable to the transportation capacity of the power lines, to 
the scarce capacity to transform the High Voltage (HV) and Extra High Voltage (EHV) plants and to the reduced 
capacity of the power grid (mesh).  
All this results in the “congestion cost”, where the power load on the grid often favors the use of non-competitive 
plants. Congestions on the primary power reserve lead to a limited competitiveness with the consequent reduction of 
the efficiency and economicity of the power system and the entrance of a new productive capacity in the system to 
the detriment of the security of demand. 
Table 1 shows the general increase of the number of hours of congestion in the market zones involved in the 
occurrence in the period 2011-2012. On the whole, the increase is of 25%, with the most significant value of the 
variation of the hourly energy blocks, represented in the North zones vs. Central zones by an increment of 73%. The 
absolute value is attributed to the zone Rosanno vs. Sicily where it gets to 5.797 hours of congestion with a n 
increase of 32%, whilst a reversed trend is recorded in the South v. C. North with a decrease of 51%. 
Table 1. Total congestion hours in the two year period 2010-201 (Source: our processing on Terna data, 2013) 
Macro areas Hours of congestions % Var 
 2010-11 2011-12  
South -> Center South 1,382 1,449 4.8% 
Rossano/Brindisi -> South 594 North -- 
*Brindisi/Foggia -> South North 838 -- 
Center South->Sardinia 1,611 1,562 -3.0% 
Rossano ->Sicily 4,370 5,797 32.7% 
Center South-> Center North 580 284 -51.0% 
North -> Center North 250 433 73.2% 
Center North -> Center South 188 Nd -- 
Sicily -> Rossano North 876 -- 
Total  8,975 11,239 25.2% 
 
The imbalance between the allocation of the resources and the structural inefficiency of the power grid, 
represented by the frequency saturation of the exchange margin between the zones of the Day Ahead Energy Market 
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(DAM), proves Sicily as the zone with the highest saturation capacity, in respect to the competent market zones and 
the highest differential level of zonal price (see Table 1) 
The implementation of the power grid and a wider spreading of the offer, also related to renewable energy 
sources26,27,28,24,29,6,15,30, has evidenced new criticalities, so that a new reorganization, that would seriously consider 
such constraints, is now necessary. 
Several suggestions are offered by the literature on the topic, as for example the study of the widening of the 
geographical borders of virtual markets in relation to variable costs of the most efficient production unities 
previously excluded from production because of power congestions31,23. 
To this decrease would correspond then an increase of dispatching costs, but of a reduced entity because applied 
to a relatively high amount of electrical power contained within the overall reduction of electricity costs paid by 
customers. 
4. Available transmission capacity and payment of transmission congestion fees in the segmented electricity 
market 
Costs associated with the transmission pricing allocation of the transfer capacity derive from the difference 
between zonal prices, according to which selling offer bids accepted in the Day Ahead Market (DAM) are calculated 
and the National Single Price (PUN) according to which the purchase offer bids accepted in that market are 
calculated32. 
In the presence of interzonal congestions, market operators signing bilateral contracts pay the fee for assignment 
of rights of use of transmission electricity (CCT). 
Transmission capacity rights can be theoretically exchanged as obligation or optional bonds. This two types of 
bonds imply different mechanisms and effects depending on the holder of the bonds: 
- with obligation bonds the holder receives the payment, in the case of a positive value, of the underlying 
asset and makes a payment, if the value is negative; 
- with optional bonds the holder receives the payment, when the value of the underlying asset is positive, 
but does not make any payments in the case of a negative value. 
De facto, the implementation of transmission rights as bonds allows a more efficient management of the power 
grid. As already seen in the case of physical transmission rights, the transactions generating power flows in the 
opposite direction in respect of those generating congestions (counterflows), allow the transfer of a higher power on 
the power lines. If the considered rights are in the form of obligation bonds, and an operator has bought that the 
transmission right for one transaction, that generates a counterflow and the holder is motivated to finalize the 
transaction related to such right, with the consequent implementation of the amount of transactions that can be 
programmed. 
The CCT are not only technical tools of the electricity market but they also reveal useful information concerning 
the level of efficiency of some interconnections in the power grid. In particular, they highlight the limitations of the 
capacity in the border zones and help in dealing with the interzonal congestions (Table 2). 
Table 2. Unitary Fees of Rights of Use of Transmission Capacity (CCT) 2010-2012 (Source: our processing onTerna data, 
2012) 
Zonal Market 2010 2011 2012 
North 2.14 2.06 1.43 
Center North 1.66 1.07 1.61 
Center South 1.53 1.37 2.32 
South 5.12 3.19 5.14 
Sicily -25.59 -20.88 -19.8 
Sardinia -9.38 -7.7 -6.19 
Foreign zones* -21.67 18.28 24.29 
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*aggregate value ref. France, Switzerland Austria, Slovenia, Bps, Greece, Corsica, Corsica. 
In order to help market operators to cover the risks related to costs associated with the fluctuation of the power 
price in different nodes and zones of the grid, the law has considered the assignment by Terna to several market 
operators of some financial tools to cover power congestion costs defined “firm transmission rights” or fixed price 
of transmission. CCC serve to cover the risk of volatility of the fee for the assignment of rights of use of 
transmission capacity (CCT), as stated in the resolution nr. 111/06 of the Authority for Electricity and Gas, that 
charges the Energy Market Manager (GME) and market operators. In order to help market operators to cover the 
risks related to costs associated with the fluctuation of the power price in different nodes and zones of the grid, the 
law has considered the assignment by Terna to several market operators of some financial tools to cover power 
congestion costs (CCC and CCP) defined “firm transmission rights” or fixed price of transmission. 
With the resolution nr. 205/04, the Authority for Electricity and Gas has considered the organization and 
definition, through competitive examinations, of useful tools to cover the risk of volatility of the fee for the 
assignment of rights of use of transmission capacity (CCT) for those operators entitled to manage dispatching points 
for power production and importing units. 
The issue value of CCC decided by the energy market manager amount to 1MW and refers to a specific period 
(in hours) and to a specific connection between two nodes14, and in particular to the CCP with unitary power value 
of 1MW, on yearly or monthly base, and referred to each single limited production pole, as stated in art. 15 of the 
resolution nr. 111/06. 
The holders of purchasesell agreements stipulated out of the bidding system can use such financial tools with the 
same benefits, too. In fact, in the presence of a non-discriminatory purpose the holders of the above mentioned 
agreements must pay, to the power grid manager, a fee for the assignment of rights of use of transmission capacity 
equal to the difference between the equilibrium price in the withdrawal zone and that of the injection zone, of 
exactly the same fee conceded by the issuer of the CCC. 
The issue of a CCC refers to a specific power transmission and require the issuer (the power grid manager) in the 
period of its validity, to make/receive hourly payments of the amount of the difference between the equilibrium 
price in the downstream zone and the equilibrium price of the upstream zone, equal to the total amount of power of 
the CCC. Conversely, the power grid manager will receive from the energy market manager, and from the holders of 
purchase and sell agreements stipulated out of the bidding system, the levy derived from the congestion costs. 
Therefore, if the power grid manager issued CCC over each transmission of the amount of the related available 
transmission capacity, the revenues deriving from congestion fees are of the same amount, for each hour, of the 
clearing fees concerning the issued CCC. The period of validity of such financial tools can be inferior to one year in 
order to facilitate the reallocation of the operators on a monthly or yearly basis, that is congruent with the duration 
of the ordinary electricity supply agreement. 
CCC are technically agreements that put into execution foreign exchange transactions with fixed fee payment, 
predetermined and independent of the evaluation spot of the fee for the assignment of rights of use of transmission 
capacity33. They consider two types of evaluation of the power transmission capacity right: 
- the implied value, when the holder of the CCC agreement can transfer predetermined hourly amounts of 
electricity in the interconnected zone, without any obligation to pay the fee resulting from the difference 
between the market price of the downstream zone (market of power destination) and the market price of 
the upstream zone (market of power production); 
- expressed value, when the holder of the CCC receives from the issuer (if positive) or pay to the issuer (if 
negative) the difference between the equilibrium price of the downstream zone and the price of upstream 
zone for the hourly amount of electricity of the amount of the capacity stated in the CCC agreement. 
The difference between the two types of evaluations consists of a greater flexibility, typical of the expressed 
value, that leaves room for a greater negotiability and remittance. Furthermore, the CCC can also be issued by 
different operators in order to allow an easier implementation of secondary markets related to CCC. 
The Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR) is one of the parameters used to evaluate market segmentation and, by 
consequence, its efficiency. 
It is not difficult to prove then that when we consider power transmission rights the condition of revenue 
sufficiency is always verified for all admissible power flows, and that it is not causing any infringement of 
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transmission capacity limits on any power node. Even though, when considering the large number of the CCC 
agreements that meet such conditions, there arise the question of how to determine how many bonds are available 
and for which transactions.  
A possible solution to the problem depends, on one hand, on the CCC required by the operators and, on the other, 
on the admissibility of derived power flows (in order to respect the condition of revenue efficiency). Therefore, the 
calculation of the overall transmission rights must be contextual to the purchase offers acquisition presented by the 
operators of the market. The mechanism adopted in this case is that of the concurrent auction: once known the 
purchase bids (coupling of maximum quantity-maximum price), transmission rights are assigned in order to 
maximize the revenues of the market manager according to transmission capacity limits on the nodes, so to 
guarantee the condition of revenue sufficiency. 
Then, the power market manager issues the rights obtaining clearing revenues deriving from the application of 
the congestion fee, of the amount of the value of each congested transfer, the admissible power flow of that transfer, 
calculated on zonal equilibrium prices (Table 3). 
Table 3 Unitary Fees of Rights of Use of Transmission Capacity (CCT) 2010-2012 (Source: Terna Development Plan, 2013) 
Typology  2010 2011 2012 
Total revenue 238,050420 162,371071 205,904425 
Unit revenue 1.6 1.12  1.58 
Market Coupling - 14,209491 69,782196 
Market Coupling - 12.29 19.15 
 
Therefore, for each node and in each hour of congestion capacity, the above mentioned clearing revenues amount 
to the mathematical product of available transmission capacity and the difference of the equilibrium prices, 
respectively, in the upstream and downstream flow. The same mechanism of rights assignment, as already 
mentioned, could apply to the necessary modifications of the assignment of optional transmission rights. In this case 
the power market manager cannot rely on the payments made by the holders of the rights of power flows in the 
opposite direction from the node congestion (counter flows). Such payments, in fact, are not due because they 
concern optional capacity rights. This implies then that the overall rights issued by Terna is more limited than the 
obligation bonds. 
Table 4 shows the number of CCC and CCP agreements assigned in the years 2011 and 2012 and the overall 
increase of the Base level. In particular, it must be noticed that the auction of CCC in the yearly peak load profile 
concerning the zone North is negative for the first time (-0.10euro/MWh)34, whilst the increase of the volatility of 
the relation between peak and off-peak prices and from the increase of the volatility of the PUN, rises to 8.8% 
(+1.5% yearly) (Table 4). 
Table 4 CCC and CCP agreements for 2011 and 2012 (Source: Terna Development Plan, 2013) 
Period Base Peak Base Peak Period Base Peak Base Peak 
Jan. 2,584 987  5,001  445  Jul. 3,927  1,436  7,840  1,748  
Feb. 2,687  787  7,977  1,568  Aug. 2,214  1,395  5,160  426  
Mar. 2,750  160  6,471  2,697  Sept. 2,856  1,395  8,532  3,684  
Apr. 2,774  1,182  9,154  3,886  Oct. 1,857  2,371  8,235  1,830  
May 1,333  595  5,008  4,747  Nov. 4,524  2,691  5,930  992  
Jun. 2,006  1,449  6,542  2,612  Dec. 3,299  1,131  5,949  430  
     Year 8,205 1,242  6,438  448  
 
The increase of supply related to the photovoltaic and eolic energy production has contributed with a massive 
thrust, especially in the south, to stabilize the rise of prices in maximum peak hours, indirectly supporting the off-
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peak quotations, concentrating the margin recovery on costs in the off-peak hours, by virtue of a higher market 
power induced by the minor presence of renewable energy supply. 
4. Conclusion 
The splitting of the country market into geographical zones and the definition of injection and with draw all 
programs allow to bypass, or limit, the criticalities related to structural limitations of the power grid system. 
The maximization of the exchange of power in neighboring zones, within the security and exchange parameters, 
leads to the formation of zonal prices whose value is influenced, positively and negatively in turn, by power 
congestions. The cost deriving from a power congestion on a power link exposes market operators to a price 
volatility. In such a context the CCC represent an efficient financial tool to guarantee the operators a complete 
coverage of the fluctuation of prices that depends, as just said, not only on the inefficiencies or limitations of the 
power grid, but also on the trend of quotations of combustibles, the intermittency of renewable and non-
programmable energies and the increased load on the power grid. 
The efforts lavished by Italian and European organizations are not only aimed at the overcoming of such 
difficulties but also to find an equilibrium to manage the capacity of international interconnection according to self-
regulatory mechanisms, to pursue the goal of the harmonization of access fees to the power transmission market and 
to better, altogether, the efficiency of the procedures of allocation of the connection capacity. 
Against these urgencies it is possible to notice a substantial commitment on the part of Terna that is carrying out 
investment programs for the refurbishment of the national power grid. On the other hand, the data referring to 
201234 when compared with the 2011, show a general increase of the amount of congestion hours that from an 
overall national perspective, is still too high. Such problems cannot be solved if the actions will not be targeted to 
the streamlining of the procedures related to the enforcement of the regulations for the refurbishment of the entire 
power grid. However, it is possible to use congestion revenues, as it happened in the past and is still happening 
today, not only as a mere reference index on which the efficiency of the transmission grid can be calculated but also 
as indicators of the necessity of future investments 
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